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A Rejoinder To The Rejoinder To On
The Theory Class's Theories of
Asbestos Litigation
Lester Brickman*
I am grateful to the editors of the Pepperdine Law Review for affording
me the opportunity to respond to Professor Silver's rejoinder' to an article
on asbestos litigation which I published in this Review in January 2004.2 In
that article, I responded to two personal attacks that Professor Silver leveled
against me in articles that he previously published Professor Silver's
Rejoinder in this issue is his response to my effort to defend myself from his
attacks.4 Unfortunately, Professor Silver's Rejoinder is inaccurate and
misleading in certain major respects. In one respect, though, the Rejoinder
does add value to scholarly discourse-by allowing the reader to compare
the competing professional views and personal philosophies of Professor
Silver and me-a comparison that I address in the conclusion of this
response.
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University.
1. Charles Silver, A Rejoinder to Lester Brickman: On The Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos
Litigation, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 765 (2005) [hereinafter Rejoinder].
2. Lester Brickman, On The Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect
Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33 (2003) [hereinafter Asbestos Litigation],
www.ssm.comlabstract=490682.
3. Charles Silver, A Critique of Burrow v. Arce, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
323, 352-54 (2001) [hereinafter A Critique]; Charles Silver, Preliminary Thoughts On The
Economics of Witness Preparation, 30 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1383, 1400-02 (1999) [hereinafter
Preliminary Thoughts].
4. In my asbestos litigation article, I responded only to the subset of charges which were
germane to my 28-page discussion of Baron & Budd's witness preparation techniques and its use of
the Script Memo; I declined, however, to respond to other personal attacks. See Asbestos Litigation,
supra note 2, at 163 n.500. For examples of the latter, see Preliminary Thoughts, supra note 3, at
1403, 1405 and A Critique, supra note 3, at 352-54.
In my article, I stated that "Professor Silver wrote an article
[Preliminary Thoughts] defending Baron & Budd's use of the [Slcript
[M]emo and strongly attacking Skepnek which appeared in a law review
symposium;. . . Nowhere in his article, however, did Silver acknowledge
that he had been retained by Baron & Budd to give his blessing to the use of
the Script Memo."5  Professor Silver says that the italicized part of my
statement is false.6  In fact, my statement is true. During judicial
proceedings dealing with the propriety of the Script Memo,7 Baron &
Budd's principal, Fred Baron, informed the court that legal ethics experts
examined the Script Memo and found it "perfectly appropriate . . . [and
that] there has been absolutely no foul committed here."8 It would later be
revealed that Professor Silver was one of those professors and it was
reported that his affidavit was used in the firm's "coaching-memo defense."9
Professor Silver seeks to bolster his argument that Baron & Budd never
retained him for the purpose of "giv[ing] his blessing to the use of the Script
Memo," by citing the fact that "[tihe firm contacted [him] after the melee
erupted, by which time all use of the memo had stopped. [Hence, i]t would
have been impossible for [him] to 'bless . . . the use of the Script
Memo."" Not so. The fact that Baron & Budd retained Professor Silver
after the Script Memo was withdrawn from use is not inconsistent with the
fact that he was retained by the firm to defend its use. Indeed, in actual fact,
5. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 161-62 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
6. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 774.
7. For the reader not familiar with the relevant events, I set forth the following context. Section
VII of my asbestos litigation article dealt with the role of party and witness testimony in specious
asbestos claiming. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 137. Included in that section was an
extensive discussion of the witness preparation techniques used by a leading asbestos law firm,
Baron & Budd, and in particular, of the "Script Memo" - a witness preparation document that has
received widespread attention after being inadvertently produced by a Baron & Budd attorney. Id. at
139-66. In my judgment, the Memo was both unethical and illegal. Id. at 146-48, nn. 428-432. In
one of the proceedings involving the propriety of the Script Memo, a former Texas Supreme Court
Justice and chair of the Court's Committee on Professionalism, testified that the Script Memo was a
"cancer on the legal system" which violated numerous Texas Ethics Rules, including rules against:
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty or fraud, assisting a witness to testify falsely, and assisting
a client in fraudulent conduct. Testimony of Eugene Cook, former Justice of the Texas Supreme
Court, at 65-66, 73, In re All Asbestos-Related Personal Injury or Death Cases To Be Filed in Bexar
County, Texas (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1997) (No. 94-CI-10078). Nonetheless, all attempts to conduct
discovery into the subject were turned back. In my article, I stated that the firm's success in
suppressing discovery displayed an "awesome power brought to bear by a leading asbestos litigation
firm against asbestos defendants and the attorneys seeking to inquire into the use of the Script
Memo." Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 166. Part of that display of power was the de-clienting
of the three defendant attorneys who were seeking discovery with respect to the Script Memo. Id. at
157-58. In addition, Baron & Budd instituted 160 separate civil contempt proceedings and sought
criminal proceedings against William Skepnek, an attorney who represented the Raymark
Corporation and who was the most aggressive of the three attorneys in seeking discovery. Id. at
158-61.
8. Tim Wyatt, Law Firm's Memo in Asbestos Lawsuit Sparks Debate, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Sept. 28, 1997, at IA.
9. See Thomas Korosec, Homefryin' with Fred Baron, DALLAS OBSERVER, Mar. 29, 2001, at 1,
available at http://www.dallasobserver.com/issues/2001-03-29/feature.html/l/index.htmil (last
visited Aug. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Homefryin'].
10. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 776 (emphasis in original).
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Baron & Budd argued in court that Professor Silver's affidavit supported
their position that there had been no wrongdoing." Moreover, Professor
Silver admits that he was retained by Baron & Budd and that, after reading
the Script Memo, he "eventually composed an affidavit containing some of
[his] opinions."'12 Professor Silver, who did not disclose the contents of his
affidavit in his Rejoinder, purports to make the affidavit available on his
webpage; however, he does not in fact do so, stating that the webpage is
password protected.'
3
Professor Silver also takes issue 14 with my statement that he defended
the firm's use of the Script Memo in Preliminary Thoughts.15 Anyone who
was aware that Professor Silver had previously been retained by Baron &
Budd to aid in its defense of the Script Memo would perceive Professor
Silver's article as a defense of the Script Memo - as I did. Moreover, in his
article, Professor Silver notes that no one at the firm has ever been
sanctioned or disciplined for use of the Script Memo, implying that it
violated no rules or laws. 16 He then further justifies the use of such witness
preparation techniques by the economics of mass tort litigation, 7 and attacks
critics of the use of the Script Memo for failing to condemn William
Skepnek,a8 an attorney who took the lead in pursuing discovery of the Script
Memo and who was the object of an unprecedented assault launched by
Baron & Budd on the grounds that Skepnek had filed false affidavits with
regard to his clients' business activities in Texas.' 9
Professor Silver also challenges my statement that in Preliminary
Thoughts, he failed to acknowledge that Baron & Budd had retained him in
its defense of the use of the Script Memo.20 A Dallas newspaper account
confirms the accuracy of my statement:
[Professor Silver's article, Preliminary Thoughts], however, failed
to mention that Baron & Budd hired him to write an affidavit used
in its coaching-memo defense. In it he argued that the firm "did
more than duty required" when it stopped using the script
document, which he called "awkward or clumsy rather than an
effort to perpetrate a fraud."
11. See Wyatt, supra note 8, at LA.
12. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 777.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 776.
15. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
16. Preliminary Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1402 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 1399-1402.
18. Id. at 1402-04. See supra note 7 and infra note 24 for an explanation of Skepnek's role.
19. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 157-61.
20. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at nn.32-50 and accompanying text.
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Silver, who testified recently in California in favor of multimillion-
dollar trial lawyers' fees, was one of the two ethics experts Baron
says he retained to school his firm in ethics in 1998. He did not
return several calls for comment.2'
After admitting the truth of my assertion,22 Professor Silver seeks to
justify his failure to acknowledge his prior retention, stating he believed
"that academic debate may be more merits-oriented when professional ties
are not disclosed.,
23
I disagree. Standard academic ethics require that any personal interest
of an academic writer, such as a retained advocacy relationship, must be
disclosed in writing in any essay, the contents of which concern that
personal interest. Otherwise readers who do not know the academic's
affiliations would not realize that the academic's judgment may have been
affected by that personal interest.
Professor Silver levels a second set of charges against me which involve
the actions of William Skepnek.24 In the same time frame as the Script
Memo litigation, in an unrelated matter, Skepnek represented 46 plaintiffs
21. See Homefryin', supra note 9, at 4.
22. See supra text accompanying note 111. Professor Silver further asserts that by my stating
that he had failed to acknowledge his retention by Baron & Budd in Preliminary Thoughts, I was
either stating or implying that he hid his relationship with Baron & Budd. Rejoinder, supra note 1,
at nn.. 42-44 I did neither. I simply stated a fact which is not in dispute. In support of his
allegation, he states that he suspects I knew that he did not bill Baron & Budd "for services relating
to the witness preparation controversy." Id. at n.45 and accompanying text. Not so. I had no
knowledge then or now of Professor Silver's financial arrangements with Baron & Budd. He also
asserts that I "believe [that he] kept [his] relationship with Baron & Budd a secret." Id.at 777-80.
However, he does not state the basis for his conclusion that he knew what I believed. In my article
responding to Professor Silver's personal attacks, I did not state my beliefs; I stated only facts.
23. Id. at 780-82.
24. For the reader not familiar with the relevant events, I again set forth the following additional
context. For the purposes of this context, I am relying on a chronology of events prepared by
William Skepnek at my request. See e-mail from William Skepnek, Attorney, to Lester Brickman,
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, (January 22, 2005) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter Chronology]. Four years prior to Skepnek's initial retention in fall 1996 to represent the
Raymark Corporation in asbestos cases filed against it in Texas - the retention that led to his
attempt to employ discovery to inquire into the uses of the Script Memo which, in turn, led to the
retaliatory steps taken by Baron & Budd, see Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 157-61, Skepnek
was retained by 46 plaintiffs to represent them in a malpractice action against five of the leading
plaintiffs' law firms in Texas. Chronology, supra. The lawsuit is described in Peter Passell,
Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement Threatens Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, March 24,
1995, at B6 [hereinafter Passell, Challenge]. Under the title, Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W. 2d 229 (Tex.
1999), the Texas Supreme Court ultimately sided with Skepnek and his clients on the issue of
whether actual damages needed to be shown to proceed with a breach of fiduciary obligation claim
against a lawyer. Id. at 232. The Arce case was first filed in October 1992. Passell, Challenge,
supra; Chronology, supra. After losing in the trial court on summary judgment, Skepnek appealed
the case to the 14th Court of Appeals in Houston. Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W. 2d 239, 244 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1997). While that appeal was pending, Skepnek was hired to defend Raymark. Chronology,
supra. In September, 1997, the Texas Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Skepnek in Arce. Id. The
case was then appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Chronology, supra. That same month, the
Script Memo appeared. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 1, at 142; Chronology, supra. By late
February 1998, Baron & Budd had filed more than a hundred sanctions motions against Skepnek and
sought two criminal prosecutions as well. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 160-61. In July
1999, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision in Arce, 997 S.W. 2d at 229.
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who were suing five of the leading plaintiffs' law firms in Texas for breach
of fiduciary obligation. This suit resulted in a landmark Texas Supreme
Court decision, Burrow v. Arce,26 upholding a client's right to fee forfeiture
if the attorney breaches a fiduciary obligation.27 Skepnek's futile pursuit of
the Script Memo had drawn Professor Silver's wrath.28 Because of Arce,
which posed a threat to mass tort lawyers, Skepnek was further targeted by
Silver, who again targeted me for failing to condemn Skepnek.29 As noted, I
partially responded to his attack in my asbestos litigation article.3°
Professor Silver takes issue with my characterizing his Preliminary
Thoughts article as assisting in Baron & Budd's assault on Skepnek.
31
Though his article strongly attacked Skepnek, to the degree that my
characterization may be read to suggest that Professor Silver was acting in
concert with Baron & Budd's attack against Skepnek,32 I wish to clarify my
position. I have no knowledge that Professor Silver was acting in concert
with Baron & Budd and accept Professor Silver's denial of any such
relationship. Professor Silver's article, however, even if not written in
concert with Baron & Budd, did support the law firm's position.
As for Professor Silver's characterization in his Rejoinder 33 of his attack
on William Skepnek at the William & Mary conference and in his
subsequent article and my responses, Professor Silver states that I have
"never questioned the accuracy of [his] account., 34  This is untrue.
Professor Silver has mischaracterized my remarks at the conference and our
correspondence thereafter. I stated that I believed some of his statements
about Skepnek were in error,35 that I was not an attorney for Skepnek,36 and
that if Professor Silver was interested in ascertaining the accuracy of his
allegations, he should "get in touch with Mr. Skepnek directly. '37 Professor
25. See Passell, Challenge, supra note 24, at B6.
26. 997 S.W. 2d at 229.
27. Id. at 232.
28. See Preliminary Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1401-02 (concluding that "[ilt is difficult to
imagine a more compelling occasion for outrage" than the Skepnek case).
29. Professor Silver wrote an article sharply critical of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Arce, and included a six page "Addendum" titled "The Silence of the Commentators Revisited,"
devoted entirely to an attack on Skepnek and me. A Critique, supra note 3, at 352-57.
30. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
31. See Rejoinder, supra note 1, at n.9 (referring to Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 161-62,
referring to Preliminary Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1401).
32. Professor Silver characterizes Baron & Budd's orchestrated attack on Skepnek as an "alleged
plot.'? Id. at 770. I have spelled out the "alleged plot" in great detail. Asbestos Litigation, supra
note 2, at 160-61. No one can mistake it for other than what it was.
33. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 766.
34. Id. at 768.
35. See e-mail from Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, to
Charles M. Silver, Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law (Mar. 30, 2001, 04:16:00
EST) (on file with author).
36. Id.
37. See id.
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Silver's statement that I "provided no documents" 38 is thus quite misleading
in implying that I had no basis for challenging his statements. This is
especially so because Professor Silver, after acknowledging that he had
intentionally failed to contact Skepnek to corroborate his allegations,39
responded by asking me to contact Skepnek and ask Skepnek to get in touch
with him, which I did.40 After a series of letters had passed between them,
Silver withdrew some of his more extreme charges in his article on the Arce
case that he later published (A Critique).4'
Professor Silver asserts that my statement included in my response to his
personal attack that he "had been retained by the Texas tobacco attorneys to
give his blessing to their fee request ' 42 was a "misstatement., 43 It is, in fact,
a correct statement. In Professor Silver's expert affidavit in the tobacco
litigation," he stated that he had been retained by the private lawyers45 and
proceeded to argue in favor of the reasonableness of the multi-billion dollar
fee request.46 A reader unaware of this fact would be hard put to notice that
in the verbal underbrush of denial there lies - well camouflaged - this
specific acknowledgement by Professor Silver: "When the lawsuit settled,
several professors, including me, rendered services relating to the lawyers'
request for payment .... ,,47 Instead, a reader who was not already fully
informed would likely be misled by Professor Silver's statement that "during
the entire period in which the payment of fees [to the private lawyers in the
state's suit against tobacco companies] was at issue-I worked without
compensation, except for reimbursement of expenses"'48 into believing that
he was not compensated for his affidavit.
Professor Silver also asserts that my contradiction of his statement "that
political forces opposed to the trial lawyers brought [the outcome in Arce]
about ' 49 is a misstatement. 50 Not so. My rejection of his characterization is
not only dead-on accurate, but Professor Silver now acknowledges this to be
38. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 766.
39. A Critique, supra note 3, at 354-55.
40. Id. at 355.
41. id. at 355-56.
42. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 163.
43. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at n.27.
44. Aff. of Professor Charles Silver, Texas v. The Am. Tobacco Co., No. 5:96-CV-0091 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 13, 1998). Because I was retained by the counsel to the Governor of the State of Texas in
1998 to provide an expert's affidavit with regard to the reasonableness of the fee sought in the
tobacco settlement (as was Professor Geoffrey Hazard), I was provided with a copy of his affidavit.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 782. This minimization of his role may be usefully contrasted to
his statement in a letter to Skepnek that he "was heavily involved in the Texas tobacco case, working
for the private attorneys who represented the State." Letter from Charles M. Silver, Professor of
Law, University of Texas School of Law, to William Skepnek, Attorney 5 (Apr. 18, 2001) (on file
with the author).
48. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 783.
49. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 163 (referring to A Critique, supra note 3, at 351 ("In
Burrow, the Supreme Court of Texas responded to pressure from one such interest group and created
a new remedy calculated to destabilize the practices of mass tort lawyers)).
50. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 784.
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so. Here are the underlying facts. In A Critique, Silver noted that Texans
for Reasonable Legal Fees (TRLF)-which was on the opposite side of the
tobacco fee issue from Professor Silver, having been involved in a futile
effort to allow Texas state courts to apply Texas ethics rules to the
determination of the reasonableness of the multi-billion dollar fee awarded
in the state tobacco litigation5 1-had filed an amicus brief in the Arce case.52
Professor Silver, after arguing that the Texas Supreme Court's analysis in
Arce of Texas case law was "misleading, '5 3 "distort[ed] Texas law, 54 and
that the rest of the Court's reasoning was "vague and superficial,"
55
concluded that no other explanation could suffice except that the "Supreme
Court of Texas responded to pressure from [the TRLF] ... and created a
new remedy calculated to destabilize the practices of mass tort lawyers. 56
Even Professor Silver has come to acknowledge that this gale force
argument is supported by not even the slenderest of reeds. Backing off from
his charge that the Texas Supreme Court "responded to pressure," 57 he now
asserts that "'political forces' sought to influence the Texas Supreme
Court[.], '58  Presumably, Professor Silver would include in the ambit of
"political forces" the three amicus briefs he filed in Arce in favor of the tort
lawyers.59 I take no issue with Professor Silver's changed position that there
were political forces that sought to influence the court, but he is still peering
under the wrong tent. In Arce, Skepnek took on five of the leading
plaintiffs' firms in Texas, the three leading defendants' law firms, and a
high-ranking member of the Texas judiciary. 60 Truly, this was David versus
51. See Lester Brickman, Lawyer's Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New World of
Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 243, 262 n.58 (2001).
52. See A Critique, supra note 3, at 331.
53. Id. at 337.
54. Id. at 338.
55. Id. at 339.
56. Id. at 351.
57. Id.
58. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 786 (emphasis added).
59. The Texas Supreme Court devoted an entire page to responding to his argument. See Burrow
v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 244-45 (Tex. 1999).
60. As related by Skepnek:
The defendants [in Arce] were Walter Umphrey, Wayne Reaud, David Burrow, John
Eddie Williams, and Ken Bailey, five of the most prominent members of the Texas
plaintiffs' bar. The defense expert, upon whose testimony the defense relied, was Robert
Malinak, of the Baker, Botts firm. A critical defense witness was Otway Denny, a
partner with Fulbright, Jaworski, the firm which had represented Phillips Petroleum in the
underlying aggregate settlement. Fulbright was, in turn, represented by the Vinson,
Elkins firm. Another critical defense witness was Texas Appeals Court Judge Alice
Oliver Parrott, who was a former partner of Burrow, and the trial judge who presided
over the settlement. "Baker Botts", "Fulbright Jaworski", and "Vinson Elkins" are the
[sic] three of the (if not the largest) largest and most influential defense firms in Houston.
We had few friends, and no political, or economic support. Approximately half of my 46
clients, most of them factory workers, came to the courtroom. All of our suit money
came from the clients themselves, or out of my pocket.
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Goliath. Skepnek's clients had few resources they could contribute beyond
their faith in Skepnek, a plaintiffs' lawyer who took their case when no other
lawyer in Texas would do so and who continued with the case on appeal
even though, in the course of those appeals, he faced 160 sanctions motions
filed against him by Baron & Budd, criminal contempt charges, a grand jury
investigation, and had no client to financially support his defenses against
the multi-pronged attack by Baron & Budd.61
CONCLUSION
Professor Silver explains that the underlying motive for his personal
attacks on me-which initiated the exchange that is the subject of this article
- was that I "seemed to display a bias in [my] public statements about
attorneys. 62 He characterizes me as an "'academic[ ]... [who seeks] to
generate anger against trial lawyers who represent plaintiffs '63 and claims
that I am engaged in a "propaganda war for control of the civil justice
system ... ."64 To support his assertions, Professor Silver presents a slanted
selection of news media quotes.65 I will leave to others to decide whether or
not I am engaged in a "propaganda war for control of the civil justice
system."
Much of my scholarship, which does focus on the civil justice system,
shares a common thematic core: to define the misalignment of legal practice
with ethical principles set forth in codes of ethics, which the bar holds out as
talismanic shields to fend off social controls in favor of continued self-
regulation.66 The main body of my scholarship concerns contingency fees.
In a series of articles, I have argued that: the ethical validity of a contingent
fee is a function of the existence of meaningful risk being assumed by the
lawyer;67 if risk is present, then the risk premium must be proportionate to
the risk and the anticipated effort that will be put at risk;68 that contingent fee
lawyers charging standard contingent fees are routinely overcharging some
claimants because, in many instances, the representation involves no
meaningful risk of no or low recovery and therefore the substantial risk
premium in these instances yields unearned and unethical windfall fees;
69
Chronology, supra note 24; see also Passell, Challenge, supra note 24.
61. See Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 160-61 (describing the events in detail).
62. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 766 (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 767 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at n.5.
65. Id. at n.28.
66. The legal profession is largely self-governing... [and] is unique in this respect .... This...
is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the
courts. To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for
government regulation is obviated.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble (2000).
67. Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without The Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 44-84 (1989).
68. Id. at 94-99.
69. Id. at 70-74; see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET. AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 787 (4th ed. 2005).
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that a hallmark of the gross overcharging that permeates contingency fee
practice is the zero-based accounting system whereby lawyers speciously
assign all tort claims a value of zero for purposes of applying their
contingent fees to recoveries even though many claims have substantial
value at the time the lawyer is retained; 70 and that the gross overcharging of
tort claimants is not only in the interest of plaintiff lawyers but also benefits
defendants' lawyers, and has received the imprimatur of the American Bar
Association.7 1
In addition to my scholarship on contingency fees, I have also
addressed, inter alia, nonrefundable retainers; 72 advance fee retainers
payments; 73  and the development of an entrepreneurial model for
nonmalignant asbestos litigation, which explains how hundreds of thousands
of specious claims have come to be filed.74
I have indeed been outspoken in criticizing actions and policies which I
believe expose the bar to opprobrium. For example, I have criticized: the
opinion of the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional
Ethics 75 legitimizing the use of a retainer artifice in order to strip the
fiduciary protection set forth in Disciplinary Regulation 9-102 (A)(2) of the
Model Code, 76 calling the opinion professionally irresponsible; 77 the
Massachusetts Supreme Court for making an exception to the "reasonable
fee" limit in the state's ethics code based largely on the bar's successful
attempt to standardize contingency fee percentages;7 8 the opinion of the
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility that lawyers may
70. See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency Fee Lawyers: Competing Data
and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 659 n.12 (2003) [hereinafter Effective Hourly
Rates].
71. See Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1996).
72. See Lester Brickman & Lawrence Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible
Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149 (1988); Lester Brickman
& Lawrence Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1993); Lester
Brickman & Lawrence Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: A Response to Critics of the
Absolute Ban, 64 U. CtN. L. REV. 11 (1995); see also Agusta & Ross v. Trancamp Contracting
Corp., 751 N.Y.S.2d 155, 158 (Civ. Ct. 2002) (noting that "[t]he leading experts in the United States
on permissible fee arrangements by lawyers are Professor Lester Brickman, Professor of Law at
Cardozo School of Law and legal ethics expert, and Professor Lawrence A. Cunningham, Professor
of Law and Business at Boston College. Their joint writings have been approvingly cited and relied
upon by courts of other jurisdictions in decisions discussing what fees lawyers may permissibly
recover for their time and services.").
73. Lester Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma: Should Payments Be Deposited to the
Client Trust Account or to the General Office Account?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1989).
74. See generally Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2.
75. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 570 (1985).
76. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(A)(2) (1980) (mandating that lawyers
may not withdraw amounts due as fees from their trust accounts when clients dispute the fee).
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text..
78. Lester Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle: Gagnon v. Shoblom, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417
(1991).
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charge standard contingent fees even when there is no meaningful risk born
by lawyers and doing so will result in windfall fees;7 9 the proposal contained
in the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission report stripping out fiduciary
protection for tort victims seeking legal representation;80 and the use of
nonrefundable retainers.81
Despite Professor Silver's effusive appraisal of the effects of my
efforts, 2 I have realized few successes. The New York Court of Appeals,
relying on my writings, did declare nonrefundable retainers unethical and
illegal; 3 and Congress did require that the same recordkeeping rules that
apply to everyone else with regard to the receipt of income also apply to tort
lawyers. 84 Other attempts to influence public policy, however, have fallen
short.8 5 For example, the "early offer" proposal which I co-authored, which
seeks to prevent price gauging by contingency fee lawyers in cases where
the lawyer is exposed to no meaningful risk, 6 has not yet been adopted by
any state legislature or supreme court, though it has earned a place in
virtually all of the major professional responsibility casebooks.87
To Professor Silver's suggestion that I and other commentators bear
some responsibility for the low esteem in which the bar is held,88 I demur.
That low esteem is not due to criticisms of various practices of lawyers and
the bar but rather to the practices which are the object of those criticisms89-
79. Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1996) (criticizing ABA Committee On Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 389 (1994)).
80. Lester Brickman, The Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection: Ethics
2000's Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181 (2003).
81. See supra note 71 and accompanying text..
82. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 792.
83. Matter of Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d 465 (1994); see John M.A. DiPippa, Lawyers, Clients, and
Money, 18 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 95, 112 (1998) (noting that "[tihe Cooperman decisions
represent a victory for Professors Brickman and Cunningham").
84. See Terry Carter, Keeping 'Em Honest, 83 A.B.A.J., Aug. 1997, at 28 (explaining the origin
of the legislation to require that 1099s be issued with regard to the proceeds generated by tort
litigation).
85. My continuing efforts in the face of this record accords me the distinction of being an
honorary citizen of La Mancha.
86. LESTER BRICKMAN ET. AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES: A PROPOSAL TO ALIGN THE
CONGTINGENCY FEE SYSTEM WITH ITS POLICY ROOTS AND ETHICAL MANDATES (1994) [hereinafter
RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES]; see also Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 70, at 723-24.
87. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 180-81 (6th ed. 2002); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR., ET.AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 788 (4th ed. 2005); THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 108 (8th ed. 2003); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. &
RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 70 (2d
ed. 2001); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 805 (4th ed. 2004).
88. Rejoinder, supra note 1, 786-90.
89. In one recent survey of public confidence in various institutions in which lawyers were rated
near the bottom, 57 percent indicated that "lawyers are more concerned with their own self-
promotion than their client's best interests." Public Perceptions of Lawyers: Consumer Research
Findings, 2002 A.B.A. SEC, OF LIT. 7. "[T]he greatest number of complaints arise around lawyers'
fees. Consumers say that lawyers charge too much." Id. at 14. A U.S. News and World Report poll
found that "69 percent of Americans believe lawyers are only sometimes honest or not usually
honest, and 56 percent say lawyers use the system to... enrich themselves." Stephen Budiansky,
et.al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 30, 1995, at 50, 51.
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in particular, those practices which are the antithesis of the bar's exhortation
that in its collective activities, it should act "in the public interest and not in
furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar."90
The contrast between my views and Professor Silver's reflected in this
exchange could not be more vivid. For example, in his Rejoinder, Professor
Silver states that law professors' self-interest should lead them "to hold pro-
lawyer views."9' That may or may not be so. However, as academics and as
ethical role models for our students, law professors have an obligation that
trumps any purported self-interest. And in the end, adherence to the highest
ethical standards of our profession - which is the legal academy and not the
legal profession - is the best guarantee of our self-interest. If that requires
telling uncomfortable truths about a small, albeit powerful, segment of the
legal profession, so be it. This view underpins my scholarship: that
identifying what is actually occurring in our legal system is, or at least ought
to be, a prime purpose of scholarship; that by identifying these truths and
bringing them to the attention of both the academy and the profession, I am
providing an opportunity to curb abuses in the legal system; and that
focusing on these abuses will ultimately be in the self-interest of the legal
profession.
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble (2000).
91. Rejoinder, supra note 1, at 790 ("The Role of Law Professors in Framing Public Discourse
About Attorneys"). Furthermore, I plead "guilty" to Professor Silver's accusations that I stated that
trial lawyers made substantial and indeed, unprecedented financial contributions to the
Kerry/Edwards campaign, that the purpose of the constitutional amendment that the trial lawyers
caused to be put on the Florida ballot in November 2004 was to force doctors to settle meritless
malpractice actions, and that in asbestos litigation, trial lawyers have targeted companies at risk and
made them offers to file pre-packaged bankruptcies that they could not refuse. Id. I even plead
"guilty" to the charge - if it is brought - that in the article on asbestos litigation that is the subject of
his Rejoinder, I concluded that hundreds of thousands of specious claims had been filed, supported
by bogus medical evidence and witness testimony resulting from implanting false memories.
Asbestos Litigation, supra note 2, at 62-166. Oddly enough, Professor Silver omits from his list of
my "lawyer-bashing," my latest statement in this genre. See President Participates in Asbsestos
Litigation Conversation (Jan. 7, 2005), at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050107-
8.html#; see also RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES, supra note 86; Effective Hourly Rates, supra
note 70, at 723-24.
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